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Results indicate that taxation has a negative effect on overall firm profits but not on returns on 
shareholder funds. This is consistent with the observed positive effect of corporate taxation rates 
on the gearing ratio, i.e. the higher corporate tax rates in a particular jurisdiction the lower the 
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jurisdictions deter valuable investment by multinational enterprises because they provide 
incentives to locate value-driving business parts requiring more equity financing elsewhere.  
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International restructurings by globally acting enterprises have become a common occurrence in 
the wake of accelerating globalization and lead to increasing global relocations of economic 
activities. Besides resource cost and infrastructure, the taxation regime, through its effects on 
institutional hurdles for business development on one hand and on international pricing on the 
other hand, is an important determinant of the geographical development of globalization.  
The tax regime ultimately affects profits of a firm, but it also affects the capital structure, i.e. the 
mix between debt and equity financing of firms, the co-called gearing ratio. The capital 
structure, in turn, affects the entrepreneurial function that can be taken on by a particular 
enterprise, e.g. highly innovative firms using and developing cutting-edge intellectual property 
tend to need more equity financing than firms performing mature routine functions. Hence the 
taxation regime may hinder or promote firms’ location of highly innovative industries in a 
particular jurisdiction by making debt financing more or less attractive relative to equity 
financing. 
In contrast to earlier literature which presented mixed results, this research presents clear 
evidence that both statutory corporate tax rates as well as firm-individual effective corporate 
income tax rates affect the gearing ratio – higher tax rates appear to lead to higher debt 
financing. While higher tax rates decrease profit levels and margins, the effect on returns to 
equity is not clear-cut. This may indicate that firms react with reducing equity financing on 
reduced profit prospects when faced with higher taxes. Lower tax rates on the other hand may 
attract more equity-financed high-value business formation. Data analyzed comes from the 
Amadeus firm-level data base as well as from the OECD and spans a panel of 240,000 firms 
from 24 European countries for the years 1985 to 2010.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic and 
institutional background, the resulting research questions posed here, as well as the hypotheses 
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to be investigated. The underlying theoretical framework is presented in Section 3. Section 4 
describes the data used. Section 5 presents the general modeling and summarizes the results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background and research questions 
Theoretical arguments for the tax sensitivity of capital structures center on the value of the 
implied tax shield from interest rate deductions1; Modigliani/Miller (1963). Accordingly, higher 
taxes should lead, ceteris paribus, to higher debt/equity ratios (gearing ratios). Several 
theoretical models explain capital structure choices; e.g. models on financial distress 
(Kraus/Litzenberger (1973), or on agency issues (Jensen/Meckling (1976), Myers (1977)). 
Wrede (2010) e.g. finds that under separate accounting, multinational enterprises adopt tax-
efficient capital-to-debt ratios and tend to shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries.2 
Moreover, according to Weichenrieder (1996) an increase in the taxation rates of foreign 
dividends may result in a lower cost of capital for the foreign subsidiary3
A similar effect is visible in the case of corporate patent filings by European multinational 
enterprises. Corporate patents are perceived as key profit drivers in many industries, such as 
. Luciano/Nicodano 
(2011) demonstrate that tax rates do not only affect the extent of inter-company lending within 
multinational enterprises but also the level of guarantees provided by the parent company. For a 
recent overview of related work see Gordon (2010). 
                                                 
1 The tax shield arises from income tax deductibility of debt financing whereas returns to equity are subject to 
corporate income tax. 
2 Wrede (2010) is based on previous work by Mintz and Smart (2004), Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008), 
Schindler and Schjelderup (2008) and Hauer and Runkel (2009) who developed theoretical models of the tax-
efficient debt financial policies of multinationals. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) show that U.S. multinationals 
adapt capital-debt compositions in response to tax incentives. Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008) observe 
for European multinational firms that the leverage ratio is more sensitive to taxation on account of international 
debt shifting than it is for stand-alone domestic firms. 
3 An increase in the taxation of foreign dividends may induce multinationals to reduce equity financing of its 
foreign subsidiaries and thereby increase the gearing ratio which in turn reduces total cost of capital since debt 
financing is less expensive than equity financing. 
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technology, pharmaceuticals and others. It has been found that corporate tax rate (differential 
to other group members) exerts a negative effect on the number of patents filed by a 
subsidiary; see, e.g., Karkinsky/Riedel (2009). Furthermore, intangible assets such as 
trademarks are also increasingly being seen as the key to competitive success and as the 
drivers of firm profit. Moreover, they constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities 
in multinational enterprises due to their and intangibility and a highly intransparent transfer 
pricing process. Dischinger/Riedel (2009) and others have argued that, for both reasons, 
MNEs have a definite incentive to locate intangible property at company affiliates with a 
relatively low corporate tax rate, thereby subjecting the income attributable to that intangible 
property to that low tax rate. Egger/Radulescu (2011) analyzed taxation of inputs and 
observed that higher employee-borne labor taxes are generally less conducive to the location 
of corporate headquarters and foreign direct investment stocks for a given host economy. 
Furthermore, their findings suggest that personal income tax rates turn out relatively less 
important than profit tax rates for bilateral FDI stocks. Da Rin et al. (2011) present evidence 
that higher effective corporate reduce entry rates of firms in European countries. 
Despite a wealth of studies, the empirical evidence on tax effects on capital structure remains 
ambiguous; Feld et al. (2011). Da Rin et al. (2010) present evidence that higher effective 
corporate taxes lead to entry of higher leveraged firms. Other studies using average effective 
tax rates, such as Booth et al. (2001), tend to find negative or insignificant effects of tax rates 
on debt financing. Other studies, such as Gordon/Lee (2001, 2007) use statutory income tax 
rates and find mixed results. While studies such as Faccio/Xu (2011) find that statutory tax 
rates are significant determinants of capital structure while other studies such as Bond/Xing 
(2010) state that statutory or average effective tax rates do contain little additional 
information once the tax-adjusted user cost of capital is taken into account. 
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This paper investigates the effects of both statutory and individual effective corporate tax rates 
on firms’ financing decisions as well as profit levels. Following the literature, the effect of tax 
rates is first analyzed on the aggregate country level by using average gearing ratios as well as 
average effective corporate tax rates as well as per-country statutory corporate tax rates. In a 
second step, the effect of taxation at the level of the individual firm is analyzed using statutory 
corporate tax rates as well as individual effective tax rates. Lastly, implications for international 
transfer pricing are discussed. For the purpose of national taxation of MNEs transfer pricing is 
utilized in order to determine the taxable profit of a national subsidiary by comparing its profits 
to profits of hypothetically comparable independent firms. Similarly international transfer 
pricing is used to determine the acceptability of a financing structure for tax purposes, i.e. for 
determining whether and to what extent intercompany debt financing can be tax deductible. 4
 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
In the adjusted present value approach, the optimal gearing ratio (debt/equity) maximizes 
the overall value of the firm where the overall firm value can be determined as the 
unlevered firm value plus tax benefits of debt minus expected bankruptcy cost of debt.5




                                                 
4 See OECD (1995/2001/2010) transfer pricing guidelines and the OECD (2012) discussion draft on chapter VI 
on intangibles. 
 (DCF) is frequently used.  Since DCF consists of discounting future cash earnings, an 
appropriate discount rate needs to be applied. The discount rate represents the (opportunity) cost 
of capital invested; if the cash flows valued are those accruing to equity (FCFE), i.e. after 
deduction of any costs of debt financing, then the discount rate represents the cost of equity 
5 See, e.g., Damodaran (2011a). 
6 See, e.g., Brealey/Myers/Allen (2006) chapters 4 or 8, Luenberger (1998) chapter 7 for an introduction. 
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financing or the required (minimum) expected return to equity (RoE).7 This RoE consists of the 
sum of the risk-free rate of interest and the equity risk premium (ERP) which can be derived 
with recourse to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)8
(1) 
. According to the standard 
convention in the CAPM, the required return for any asset i, ri, can be expressed as: 
( )i f i m fr r r rβ= + −  and  (2) 2 2
im im i m
i
m m
σ ρ σ σ
β
σ σ
= =  
where rf denotes the risk-free rate of interest, rm denotes the market return, σ im and ρim denote 
the covariance and the correlation coefficient, respectively, between firm i’s return on equity 
and the market return, σi denotes the standard deviation of asset i’s return, σm denotes the 
standard deviation of the market return, and σ2m denotes the variance of the market return. 
Suppose asset i is a particular firm financed with a debt to equity ratio of δi and taxed at rate τ, 
then equation (2) becomes 







= + − . 
According to Modigliani/Miller (1958), equation (2) denotes the pure investment risk 
(captured by the “asset beta”) whereas equation (2’) also captures the additional financing risk 
due to debt financing. Note that while volatility is a significant determinant of returns, the 
market correlation ρim is typically not significant. This has been shown repeatedly in capital-
market studies and also seems to hold with enterprise data. In fact, empirical analyses using 
historical financial markets data show that the ERP paid by the capital market for the 
                                                 
7 FCFE is widely used and can be particularly useful for the valuation of firms with varying gearing (debt/equity 
financing) ratios. See, e.g., Shaw (2007), p. 15. 
8 See Sharpe (1964), Treynor (1962), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966), and Markowitz (1959). For more recent 
discussions see, e.g., Perold (2004), Fama/French (2004). For a multi-period extension, see Fama (1977). 
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assumption of risk corresponds to a multiple of the standard deviation of RoE. 9
(3) 
 Taking this 
into account and treating the market return volatility as given, we can define αi as: 
(1 (1 ) ) ( )imi i m f
m
r rρα τ δ
σ
= + − − . 
For the firm i, let Ci be its contemporary FCFE, ri its required return on equity (the applicable 
discount rate), and gi the expected growth rate of Ci. Firm i’s market value of equity will then 











and firm i’s overall value is given by the sum of Vi and the value of its debt. 
Furthermore, let σCi be the standard deviation of Ci then the required return on equity can be 
expressed as  









Using the adjusted present value approach and taking debt into account equation (4) can be 
rewritten for the free cash flow to firm (FCFF) taking debt into account and applying the 
weighted cost of capital (WACC) for discounting and then subtracting debt again. Let Ei be the 
firm’s contemporary earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), let the (market) value of total 
debt be Di and the debt interest rate charged to firm i be given by rid. Then given CAPM and 
using DCF with WACC, firm i’s market value of equity solves 
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9See Damodaran (2011b), Lutz (2012a), Lutz/Kleinfeldt (2012).  
10 This formulation allows for the joint determination of firm value and discount rate in cases where the applicable 
discount rate is not known, e.g. when valuing firms that are not publicly quoted; see Lutz (2012b). 
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The optimal debt level (gearing ratio) maximizes Vi i.e. it solves 
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With rid increasing in debt11
(10)    
, debt will be chosen such that 
/(1 )di ir g τ= −  
hence the higher the tax rate the higher debt and gearing.  
Furthermore, we have 
(11)    
/(1 ) 0i i i i
f i i i






∂ + −  
and therefore an increase in the tax rate decreases firm i’s market value of equity at a 
decreasing rate. Similarly, it can be shown that an increase in the tax decreases (after-tax) 
return on equity, but this holds only for positive growth rates. 
 
4. The Data 
The empirical analysis is based on firm-level data from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS 
database and from Thomson Reuters Mutual Funds Holding (s12 Master File data); these data 
have been provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) as well as directly by 
Bureau van Dijk. Data on statutory corporate income and dividend income tax rates have been 
obtained from the OECD website. Further data on US and European stock and bond markets 
                                                 
11 As the debt to equity ratio increases, the default risk increases and lenders demand a higher interest rate. 
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as well as on macroeconomic indicators have been assembled from a variety of sources. A full 
list of data sources utilized and data obtained is given in Table 1 in the appendix. A full list of 
variables used is given in Table 2 in the appendix. Some data on tax rates as well as summary 
statistics for selected variables are provided in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. Table 3.1. shows in 
particular that statutory tax rates have been reduced significantly in the OECD countries since 
1985.12
The latest Amadeus database version (available through WRDS) contains financial data 
(profit and loss statement and balance sheet data) for more than 407,000 companies from 41 
European countries; the corresponding data for the years 1985 to 2010 (between 1 and ten 
years; 5.5 years on average) were downloaded and compiled in July 2011. OECD tax data 
was available for 24 of those European countries. Restricting the data set to firms from those 
24 countries reduced the number of companies covered to about 240,000 firms. 
 
Amadeus data collected includes in particular the following variables: company identification 
(name, BvD ID number, ticker, address etc.), trade and activities descriptions, industry codes 
(NACE 1.1 and NAICS 2002), shareholder information, year of incorporation, number of 
employees, profit/loss data (revenue, cost of goods sold, operating cost, EBIT, etc.), balance 
sheet data (total assets, working capital, shareholders funds, etc.), cash flow, enterprise value, 
liquidity and financing ratios, and return on shareholder funds. Thomson Reuters data collected 
includes in particular share prices and numbers of shares outstanding. 
<< Include Table 1. here >> 
The data allow for analyses of tax effects on several profit and return measures as well as on 
financial ratios such as the gearing ratio (debt-to-equity financing ratio). Firms’ trade and 
                                                 
12 Note that the OECD does not report additional subcentral government taxes for all countries, e.g. Italy’s IRAP of 
about 4-5% is not included in the data. However, note that omitting the IRAP will be reflected in an increase in 
the Italian country effect to the extent that Italian firms are similarly affected.  
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activities descriptions as well as their industry codes were screened in order to generate 
indicator (dummy) variables for the functions manufacturing, wholesale, retail, and service, 
activities. Shareholder and independence variables were screened to create an independence 
indicator (dummy) variable according to customary benchmark selection criteria. Further 
dummy variables were created per country, year, and consolidation code. 
<< Include Table 2. here >> 
Data on general macroeconomic developments and climate were taken from the Ifo Institute’s 
collection of European economic indices as well as from Eurostat via the European Central 
Bank. These comprise indices for European economic climate, European capacity utilization, 
and European production.  
<< Include Table 3.1. here >> 
Data on US and European stock market and bond market returns were taken from Damodaran 
(2010), from ECB, Bundesbank and CESifo websites, and from Bloomberg. These comprise the 
S&P 500 and the MSCI Europe stock market indices, 6-month US treasury bills, 10-year US 
treasury bonds, and generic Euro-area 10-year and 3-months government benchmark bonds. 
<< Include Table 3.2. here >> 
Where appropriate the data and variables are further discussed together with the results 
presented in section 4 below. 
 
5. Modeling and results 
For the preliminary analysis of aggregate country-level data the following general model is 
used: 
(12) , , ,j t j t t j t jy H Mα ε η= +Γ + ∆ + +  
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where the dependent variable tjy ,  is the average gearing ratio, the average effective tax rate or 
an average profit level indicator (e.g. return on shareholder funds) of country j in period t; 
tjH ,  is a vector of determinants that may vary between countries and also over time (e.g., 
statutory tax rates, average gearing ratio, average return on shareholder funds); tM  is a vector 
of period-specific determinants outside of a particular country (e.g. global economic factors 
and market indicators); tj ,ε is an idiosyncratic error term that may vary between countries and 
also over time and is independently distributed with E( tj ,ε ) = 0; and jη  represents 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries, i.e., a country specific random effect that is 
independently distributed. This general specification allows for either random-effects or 
fixed-effects modeling, where the random or fixed effects are country-specific components.13
<< Include Table 3.3. here >> 
 
For the detailed analysis of the firm-level panel data the generalized regression model is 
modified in the following way: 
(13) , , ,i t i i t t i t iy F G Mα ε η= +Β +Γ + ∆ + +  
where the dependent variable tiy ,  tiy ,  is the individual gearing ratio, the individual effective 
tax rate or an individual profit level indicator (e.g. return on shareholder funds)  of company i 
in period t; iF  is a vector of determinants specific to firm i but invariant over time (such as 
country, industry, functions performed, date incorporated); tiG ,  is a vector of determinants 
that may vary between firms and also over time (e.g., material costs, working capital, income 
volatility); tM  is a vector of period-specific determinants outside of a particular firm (e.g. 
global economic factors and market indicators); ti,ε is an idiosyncratic error term that may 
                                                 
13 See, e.g. Greene (2002) for an introduction into fixed and random effects in panel data modeling. 
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vary between firms and also over time and is independently distributed with E( ti,ε ) = 0; and 
iη  represents unobserved heterogeneity across firms, i.e., a company specific random effect 
that is independently distributed. 
This general specification allows for either random-effects or fixed-effects modeling, where the 
random or fixed effects are firm-specific components. The more general approach is to allow 
for random firm-specific effects; the case where these effects are fixed, that is determinate 
constants instead of random variables, is a special sub-case. The data available contains several 
firm-specific, time-invariant variables that can be assumed to capture a significant part of 
present fixed effects (e.g. country, industry indicators, functional dummies, etc.). Hence a 
random-effects specification seems to be a priori more appropriate. On the other hand, the 
random-effects estimation procedure assumes that firm-specific effects are uncorrelated with 
the independent variables and is efficient under this assumption. If the assumption is violated, 
the random-effects estimator is biased while the fixed-effects estimator is still consistent.14
In order to test the hypotheses introduced in Sections 2 and 3, several sets of regressions are 
run. The first set of regressions in Models (4.1.*
 
Therefore, Hausman specification tests have been conducted with the null hypothesis of the 
random-effects model being efficient (and consistent); these tests indicate that the firm-specific 
effects may be correlated with the independent variables. However, since both random- and 
fixed-effects models yield qualitatively similar results, both are reported here. 
15
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Greene (2002), Hausman (1978). 
) present preliminary explorations of the 
aggregate country-level data. The second set of regressions in Models (4.2.*) presents a first 
overview with several simple pooled OLS regressions. The third set of regressions in Models 
(4.3.*) analyses profit variables (rshf) while the fourth set of regressions in Models (4.4.*) and 
(4.5.*) analyzes capital structure variables (gear). Since various profitability indicators and 
15 “*” denotes a place holder; e.g. for models (4.1.1), (4.1.2), and so forth in table 4.1. 
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several tax rate measures are positively correlated with each other16
<< Include Table 3.4. here >> 
, the results presented within 
these models are generally robust to some degree regardless of particular variables chosen.  
Thus the random-effects specification of Model (4.1.3) is given by: 
(14) 1jt jt j t i jtavgcygear citprofrate C Yα γ η ε= + +Γ + ∆ + +   
where C and Y are year and country dummies, respectively. The OLS specification of Model 
(4.2.1) is given by: 
(15) 1 2 1 ,it it it i i t t itgear tx tx F G Mα γ γ ε−= + + +Β +Γ + ∆ +   
where F includes country dummies and M includes year dummies. The fixed-effects 
specification of Model (4.3.3) is then given by: 
(16) 1 ,it i it i t t itgear tx G Mα β γ ε= + + +Γ + ∆ +   
where M includes yearly macroeconomic indicators. The instrumental-variables random-effects 
specification of Model (4.4.1) is then given by: 
(17.a) 1 2 ,it it it i i t t i itgear tx shfd F G Mα γ γ η ε= + + +Β +Γ + ∆ + +  
(17.b) 1 2 ,it it it i i t t ittx citprofrate shfd F G Mα γ γ ε= + + +Β +Γ + ∆ +  
where the individual effective corporate tax rate (tx) in equation (17.a) is instrumented using the 
statutory rate (citprofrate) in equation (17.b). The random-effects specification of Model (4.5.2) 
is given by: 
(18) 1 ,it it i i t t i itrshf cittargted_yes F G Mα γ η ε= + +Β +Γ + ∆ + +   
                                                 
16 See Table 3.4 for correlation coefficients of various profit and return on capital variables. 
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where F includes industry dummies and M includes year dummies. The other models are set up 
accordingly. The results of all model regressions are summarized in Tables 4.1 through 4.5 and 
reported below.  
<< Include Table 4.1. here >> 
Aggregate country level results are reported in Table 4.1 indicate that statutory corporate 
income tax rates influence average gearing ratios positively whereas using average effective tax 
rates produces mixed results. Results indicate that an increase in the statutory tax rate of one 
percentage point tends to increase the gearing ratio by between 1.1 and 3.4 percentage points. 
This holds true for a variety of pooled regression and random-effects panel-specifications, 
whereas fixed-effects models yield no stable results even for statutory tax rates.  
Comparing models (4.1.2) and 4.1.3) shows that a random-effects model with year and country 
dummies can explain more than half of the variation in the average gearing ratio (avgcygear); if 
the model uses only the statutory corporate income tax rate as an explanatory variable besides 
year and country dummies, still over a third of the variation of the average gearing ratio can be 
explained. Model (4.1.4) uses an indicator variable for tax rate changes (dtaxtotal) as an 
explanatory variable. While this variable carries less information17
On the other hand, neither statutory tax rates nor average effective tax rates show significant 
negative effects on average profits and returns (not reported here); since the available data set 
includes only 23 countries, this latter result may be due to a lack of data.  
, the model is still able to 
explain close to a quarter of the variation of the average gearing ratio. 
Simple pooled OLS regressions give a first impression of the individual firm-level results to be 
expected.  
                                                 
17 The variable dtaxtotal takes a value of one (minus one) if the statutory corporate income tax rate is increased 
(decreased) in comparison to last year’s rate. The total of 283 observations include 88 tax decreases and 26 tax 
increases; see table 3.2 in the appendix. 
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<< Include Table 4.2. here >> 
Results using effective individual tax rates basically indicate that taxes do tend to decrease 
returns on shareholder funds and increase the gearing ratio. However, statutory taxes do not 
seem to have a significant negative effect on returns to shareholder funds. The results for the 
gearing ratio are reported in Table 4.2; results for returns to shareholder funds are reported in 
Table 4.5 and discussed later in this section.  A positive effect of taxation on the gearing ratio 
can be shown to be significant regardless of how taxes are measured – either as effective 
individual taxation rate or as statutory corporate tax rate. Model specifications typically explain 
close to half of the variation in the firm-individual gearing ratios while both statutory tax rate 
variables and individual effective tax rate variables are highly significant. Model 4.2.1 also 
illustrates that the effective tax rate variable remains significant also when estimated together 
with several statutory tax rate measures. Results indicate that an increase in the statutory or 
effective tax rate of one percentage point tends to increase the gearing ratio by between 1.1 and 
4.4 percentage points. 
Table 4.3 presents two random effects (RE) and two fixed effects (FE) specifications using a 
variety of statutory tax rate variables.  
<< Include Table 4.3. here >> 
These models basically confirm the preliminary results presented so far. Model 4.3.2, e.g., again 
shows the indicator variable for tax rate changes (dtaxtotal) as (statistically) significant 
determinant of the gearing ratio. Furthermore, the indicator for special tax rate incentives 
(cittargeted_yes) is also a significant determinant of the gearing ratio, which seems to indicate 
that firms do react to special tax incentives offered by individual jurisdictions. 
Table 4.4. presents various instrumental variables models – random effects (RE-IV) and fixed 
effects (FE-IV) models – using individual effective taxation with or without statutory tax rate 
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measures as explanatory variables. Individual effective taxation rate (tx) is instrumented by a 
variety of statutory tax rate measures together with contemporary revenue, cost, and profit 
measures. All estimations include a lagged dependent variable, control for yearly effects and, 
where appropriate, for country effects.  
<< Include Table 4.4. here >> 
Effective tax rates as well as statutory tax rates have significant and positive effects on the 
gearing ratio in all models presented. The random-effects specifications explain around half of 
the fluctuation of the gearing ratio whereas the fixed-effects specifications still explain around 
40 percent. Results indicate that an increase in the effective tax rate of one percentage point 
tends to increase the gearing ratio by between 1.6 and 3.8 percentage points.  
In summary the effect of taxation on the gearing ratio can be demonstrated consistently using 
both aggregate and firm-individual data and across a variety of model specifications and 
estimation techniques. The picture looks somewhat different when examining possible effects 
of tax rates on profit measures. Neither effective individual taxation rates nor statutory 
corporate tax rates can be shown to have a clear negative impact on returns to equity. This is 
presented in table 4.5 for a variety of OLS, RE, FE and IV models.  
<< Include Table 4.5. here >> 
As can be seen in model 4.5.5, e.g., negative and significant effective tax rate effects tend to be 
very small when they can be identified.  
This picture changes when profit levels and profit margins (as percentage of sales) are 
investigated. 
<< Include Table 4.6. here >> 
As can be seen in the models presented in Table 4.6. increases in both statutory tax rates and 
Tax effects on MNEs   17 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
effective tax rates significantly decrease profit levels and margins. 
The results presented obtain seemingly uniformly across all countries in the sample. When 
country indicator variables are used to differentiate between countries, they do not lead to 
different results concerning taxation effects. Similarly, market concentration does not seem to 
systematically affect the results obtained. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Corporate taxation negatively affect firm’s profit levels and margins. However, this seems not 
to be the case for returns on shareholder funds. Corporate taxation rates positively affect the 
gearing ratio, i.e. the higher corporate tax rates in a particular jurisdiction the higher the ratio of 
debt financing to equity financing of firms residing in that jurisdiction. This suggests that 
increased tax rates lead to increasing gearing ratios by a decrease in equity financing such that 
returns to equity do not drop with profit levels. 
The observed positive effects of taxation on firms’ capital structure choice are significant and 
robust over a large variety of specifications. While the body of pre-existing literature so far 
presented ambiguous results (Feld et al. (2011), the results presented here give a clear indication 
and are more in line with other newer research such as Faccio/Xu (2011). In addition, both the 
theoretical model and the empirical evidence presented here indicate an explanation for the 
diverse results received so far. Taxation reduces profit levels and sales margins as well as equity 
(increased gearing ratio). Since equity falls, return on equity may not fall to the same extent as 
profit levels. This is confirmed by the data presented; it can also be derived theoretically, as 
outlined here. 
Interpreted in a wider context, these results indicate that high-tax jurisdictions may deter 
valuable investment by multinational enterprises because they provide incentives to locate 
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value-driving business parts requiring more equity financing elsewhere.  
These findings also have important implications for international transfer pricing.  International 
transfer pricing is used to determine whether and to what extent intercompany debt financing 
can be tax deductible. The research presented here implies that effective tax levels are an 
important determinant of capital structure and therefore need to be taken into account when 
evaluating multi-national firms’ inter-company financing structures for tax purposes.  
The results presented here lead to some important questions open for further research. Notably, 
to what extent does taxation, through its effect on financing, ultimately affect other elementary 
business decisions such as R&D and innovative activity as well as entry and location decisions? 
Furthermore, can we observe regionally diverse effects of tax rate differences in different 
jurisdictions? Other open questions include possible differential tax effects on small and 
medium firms or possible effects of marginal effective tax rates on financing.  Further research 
may also include analyzing data from non-European and in particular North-American firms. 
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Table 1. Data sources 
# Data type Source Downloaded / data Date 
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   (to be continued)  
                                                 
18 Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) was used in preparing part of the data set used in the research reported 
in this paper. This service and the data available thereon constitute valuable intellectual property and trade secrets 
of WRDS and/or its third-party suppliers. 
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   Table 1. Data sources (continued)  
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Table 2. List of variables 
Variable Definition 
id_number BvD ID number (alphanumeric), Bureau van Dijk’s 
unique identification number for firms 
BvD Firm ID number (numeric) 
Year Year 
nacpri NACE Rev.1.1 industry code 
naicor NAICS 2002 industry code 
yearinc Year of incorporation 
opre Operating revenue, EUR thousand 
gros gross profit, EUR thousand 
ebit EBIT, EUR thousand 
ebta EBITDA, EUR thousand 
fipl Financial profit/loss, EUR thousand 
depre Depreciation, EUR thousand 
inte Interest paid, EUR thousand 
plbt Profit/loss before tax, EUR thousand 
taxa Taxation, EUR thousand 
plat Profit/loss after tax, EUR thousand 
pl Profit/loss for the period, EUR thousand 
cf Cash flow, EUR thousand  
av Added value, EUR thousand 
toas Total assets, EUR thousand 
wkca Working capital, EUR thousand 
cash Cash and cash equivalent, EUR thousand 
capi Capital, EUR thousand 
ltdb Long-term debt, EUR thousand 
loan Loans, EUR thousand 
tshf Total shareholder funds and liabilities, EUR thousand 
curr Current ratio  
solr Solvency ratio (%) 
prma Profit margin (%) 
liqr Liquidity ratio 
shlq Shareholders liquidity ratio 
gear Gearing ratio (%) 
prc Share price, end of quarter 
enva / envainv Enterprise value, EUR thousand / inverse of enva 
rshf Return on shareholder funds (%) 
rcem Return on capital employed (%) 
rtas Return on total assets (%) 
 (to be continued) 
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rprc Percentage change of prc: (prc-l.prc)/l.prc 
 sp500returns S&P 500 stock returns 
rmxeuye Return on MSCI Europe Index year end 
USTBills6m US Treasury Bill rates 6 months 
USTBonds10y US Treasury Bond rates 10 years 
EurGovtBonds3m ECB European govt bond yield 3 months 
EurGovtBonds10y ECB European govt bond yield 10 years 
IFO_eur IFO index, economic climate, Euro zone 
Cap_Util_EWU  Capacity utilization, in percent, Euro zone (16) 
Active Dummy variable, by legal status 
Independence Dummy variable, if IndepA or IndepB or 
ishdirect<=25% 
Manufacturing Dummy variable; set to “1” if NACE 1.1 (10*, 15*, 
17*-35*), NACE 2 (10*-32*) or NAICS (31*-33*) 
industry codes indicate manufacturing or if company 
description (in trade description English, main activity 
or secondary activity) contains at least one of the 
terms manufact*, manufact*, producti*, Producti* 
Wholesale Dummy variable; set to “1” if NACE 1.1 (50*-51*), 
NACE 2 (45*-46*) or NAICS (42*) industry codes 
indicate wholesale or if company description (in trade 
description English, main activity or secondary 
activity) contains at least one of the terms Wholesal*, 
wholesal*, whole sal*, Whole sal* 
Retail Dummy variable; set to “1” if NACE 1.1 (52*), 
NACE 2 (47*) or NAICS (44*- 45*) industry codes 
indicate retail or if company description (in trade 
description English, main activity or secondary 
activity) contains at least one of the terms Retail*, 
retail*, end custom*, end consum* 
Service Dummy variable set to “1” if NACE 1.1 (25*-37*, 
40*-41*, 90*), NACE 2 (33*-39*) or NAICS (54*-
56*) industry codes indicates service or repair or if 
company description (in trade description English, 
main activity or secondary activity) contains at least 
one of the terms repair*, service*, traini*, consul* 
<Country>  Dummy variable, by <Country> 
_IYear_<year> Dummy variable, by <year> 
consol_<#>  Dummy variables, by BvD consolidation code, _1 if 
“C1”, _2 if “C2”, _3 if “LF”, _4 if “U1”, _5 if “U2” 
 (to be continued) 
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3-period moving average of rshf 
(rshf +l.rshf +l2.rshf)/3 
std3rshf 3-period moving standard deviation of rshf 
avg3<var> 3-period moving average of <var> 
std3<var> 3-period moving standard deviation of <var> 
tx Effective tax rate (%), 100*(plbt-plat)/plbt 
citcentralinclsurtax Central government corporate income tax rate incl. 
surtax 
citcentralexclsurtax Central government corporate income tax rate excl. 
surtax 
citcentraladjusted Central government corporate income tax rate, 
adjusted 
citcombined Combined corporate income tax rate 
citprofrate Corporate income tax rate on distributed profits (CIT) 
cittargetedyes Targeted CIT (special lower rates for qualifying 
income) exists 
pretaxdistprof Pre-tax distributed profits (tax gross-up) 
distprof Distributed profits 
withholdtax OECD Final with-holding tax 
netpersonaltax Net personal tax (at shareholder level) 
pitdivrate Personal income tax rate on (grossed-up) dividends 
(PIT) 
taxtotal Overall PIT + CIT rate 
dtaxtotal Indicator tax change; taking values -1, 0, +1 for 
negative, no, or positive tax change, respectively 
citshare CIT share in taxtotal 
pitshare PIT share in taxtotal 
avgcygear Average gearing ratio (per country per year) 
avgcy<var> Average <var> (per country per year); variable names 
for Independence, Active, and industry dummies are 
abbreviated as avgcyInd, etc. 
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Table 3.1.a Taxation of Corporate and Capital Income 2011 
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Table 3.1.b. Taxation of Corporate and Capital Income 1985 






income tax rate 














      
      
      
                
                
Australia   46.0   46.0 0.0   46.0 
Austria   55.0   55.0 0.0   55.0 
Belgium   45.0   45.0 0.0   45.0 
Canada   37.8 (36.0)   37.8 11.6   49.4 
Czech 
Republic   -   - -   - 
Denmark   50.0   50.0 -   50.0 
Finland   43.0   n.a. n.a.   61.8 
France   50.0   50.0 0.0   50.0 
Germany   56,0   50.9 9.1   60.0 
Greece   49.0   49.0 0.0   49.0 
Hungary   n.a.   n.a. n.a.   n.a. 
Iceland    n.a.   n.a. n.a.   n.a. 
Ireland   50.0   50.0 0.0   50.0 
Italy   52,2 (36)   46.4 0.0   46.4 
Japan   43.3   n.a. 5.0 / 12.3 / 12.0   n.a. 
Korea   n.a.   n.a. n.a.   n.a. 
Luxembourg   (40.0)   n.a. n.a.   n.a. 
Mexico   42.0   42.0 0.0   42.0 
Netherlands    43.0   43.0 0.0   43.0 
New Zealand   45.0   45.0 0.0   45.0 
Norway   29.8   29.8 21.0   50.8 
Poland   n.a.   n.a. n.a.   n.a. 
Portugal   51.60 (45.00)   51.12 (45.00) 4.0   55.12 
Slovak Republic -   - -   - 
Spain   35.0   35.0 0.0   35.0 
Sweden       52.0   52.0 -   56.6 
Switzerland   9.8   6.677 25.19   31.866 
Turkey   n.a.   n.a. n.a.   n.a. 
United Kingdom 40.0   40.0 0.0   40.0 
United States   46.0   42.8 7.0   49.8 
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Table 3.2. Overall tax rate on distributed profits: tax rate changes by country 1985-2011 
Country Tax decreases Tax increases 
Austria 1 0 
Belgium 2 0 
Czech Republic 11 0 
Denmark 2 1 
Estonia 4 0 
Finland 0 2 
France 8 4 
Germany 0 1 
Greece 3 1 
Hungary 2 4 
Ireland 9 2 
Italy 5 3 
Luxembourg 3 0 
Netherlands 5 1 
Norway 3 2 
Poland 3 0 
Portugal 3 0 
Slovenia 4 1 
Spain 5 1 
Sweden 3 0 
Switzerland 9 0 
United Kingdom 3 3 
   
Sum 88 26 
 
Source: OECD Overall statutory tax rates on dividend income , downloaded 24 February 2012, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3746,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_1,00.html#C_Cor
porateCaptial, and authors calculations. 
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Table 3.3. Summary statistics (selected variables) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
yearinc 1142581 1984.052 19.01302 1851 2010 
nacpri 1138032 4661.635 1973.946 100 9900 
naicor 1138032 4229.729 1257.873 1100 9281 
Active 1363158 .8151322 .3881904 0 1 
Independence 1363158 .1767271 .3814378 0 1 
Manufacturing 1363158 .2155796 .4112239 0 1 
Wholesale 1363158 .188824 .3913689 0 1 
Services 1363158 .2865258 .4521382 0 1 
Retail 1363158 .0566545 .2311813 0 1 
toas 1362858 3.19e+07 9.21e+07 -2631842 1.00e+09 
shfd 1363158 1.38e+07 5.28e+07 1 9.96e+08 
empl 1009079 281.2701 3349.529 0 1893091 
opre 1243491 3.60e+07 9.98e+07 1 1.00e+09 
plbt 1363158 2778379 1.39e+07 1 8.87e+08 
cf 1149993 3169230 1.28e+07 -4.26e+08 9.76e+08 
rshf 1363158 38.57373 64.9938 .01 1000 
std3rshf 762017 15.25405 29.60213 0 572.8825 
cash 1299641 2925209 1.61e+07 -1.19e+08 9.98e+08 
capi 1340705 4792965 2.91e+07 -3.87e+08 9.99e+08 
ltdb 1248418 4228223 2.62e+07 -1.39e+08 9.23e+08 
loan 1294618 2200139 1.17e+07 -4.51e+08 8.54e+08 
wkca 1319660 6078313 2.26e+07 -7.23e+08 9.57e+08 
enva 11727 2126022 1.77e+07 -1.73e+07 8.71e+08 
cost 73662 3.22e+07 9.42e+07 -2.12e+08 9.62e+08 
gros 85959 1.03e+07 3.37e+07 -4.70e+07 9.68e+08 
oope 121868 4539033 2.07e+07 -3.29e+08 8.98e+08 
fipl 1360980 388311.9 9906510 -3.55e+08 9.60e+08 
taxa 1333850 592380.3 3029862 -4.71e+08 6.74e+08 
plat 1333126 2244698 1.26e+07 -3.77e+08 8.87e+08 
expt 245230 935979.5 1.92e+07 -780701 9.96e+08 
mate 998146 2.18e+07 6.73e+07 -9.01e+08 9.98e+08 
staf 1160365 5347024 2.05e+07 -2.61e+08 9.62e+08 
depre 1188892 1055451 4586149 -2.59e+08 4.03e+08 
inte 1163553 452751.2 2467879 -2.42e+07 8.01e+08 
av 973441 9002240 2.87e+07 -5.18e+08 9.94e+08 
ebit 1346352 2416761 1.06e+07 -4.41e+08 8.00e+08 
ebta 1216452 3484196 1.30e+07 -4.17e+08 8.01e+08 
curr 1328172 2.620336 6.941465 0 99.98 
solr 1362853 37.16301 26.04185 0 100 
prma 1243617 8.212753 13.26387 0 100 
rcem 1140735 29.12828 44.4509 -112.32 1000 
liqr 1311422 2.178741 6.70824 0 99.98 
shlq 1141194 50.60817 364.6084 0 10000 
    (to be continued) 
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 Table 3.3. Summary statistics (selected variables) (continued) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
rtas 1362851 9.275726 11.0921 -7.52 100 
consol_1 1363158 .03409 .1814603 0 1 
consol_2 1363158 .059514 .2365843 0 1 
consol_4 1363158 .8617915 .3451188 0 1 
consol_5 1363158 .0446016 .2064275 0 1 
tx 1333126 .4434162 17.8537 -3715 16513 
citcentraladjusted 1362903 30.54193 5.93674 6.137 53.2 
citsubcentral 159726 12.50364 6.376693 0 21.661 
citcombined 1362903 32.00737 5.363256 12.5 60.1 
cittargetedyes 1363148 .6179659 .485885 0 1 
citprofrate 1249289 31.57176 5.156022 12.5 60.1 
withholdtax 408777 12.70318 5.303518 0 25 
pitdivrate 1249289 31.49136 16.28147 0 72.8 
netpersonaltax 1249289 22.9841 10.28337 0 72.8 
taxtotal 1249289 47.28863 8.19538 21 89.1 
citshare 1249289 67.96553 12.14718 25.4 100 
Belgium 1363158 .0533291 .224689 0 1 
France 1363158 .1730746 .3783119 0 1 
Germany 1363158 .082771 .2755359 0 1 
Italy 1363158 .1823164 .3861052 0 1 
Netherlands 1363158 .0412315 .1988252 0 1 
Norway 1363158 .0410327 .1983659 0 1 
Poland 1363158 .0441563 .2054423 0 1 
Spain 1363158 .158815 .3655037 0 1 
Sweden 1363158 .041957 .200491 0 1 
UK 1363158 .0605447 .2384934 0 1 
2000 1363158 .0684785 .2525653 0 1 
2001 1363158 .0753625 .2639755 0 1 
2002 1363158 .0818651 .2741591 0 1 
2003 1363158 .0888789 .284569 0 1 
2004 1363158 .1006545 .3008708 0 1 
2005 1363158 .1150358 .3190653 0 1 
2006 1363158 .1275017 .3335343 0 1 
2007 1363158 .1306048 .3369678 0 1 
2008 1363158 .1158098 .3199968 0 1 
2009 1363158 .0459785 .2094386 0 1 
sp500returns 1362403 .0165841 .1968936 -.3658 .372 
rmxeuye 1201885 -.0130648 .2458795 -.4723618 3040179 
USTBills6m 1362403 .0413832 .026466 .0159 .14 
USTBonds10y 1362403 .0692684 .0817308 -.1112 .2348 
EurGovtBonds3m 1295232 2.96272 .9379818 .63 4.15 
EurGovtBonds10y 1362403 .043302 .0057413 .0344088 .1016043 
IFO_eur 1362403 88.78034 14.40186 57.83898 116.5254 
Capacity_Util_EWU 1362403 81.81994 2.610822 71.3 84.2 
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Table 3.4. Correlations (selected variables) 
 tx gear rshf shfd opre cf 
       
tx 1.0000      
gear 0.0103 1.0000     
rshf -0.0092 0.2330 1.0000    
shfd -0.0045 -0.0671 -0.0809 1.0000   
opre -0.0036 -0.0386 0.0039 0.5175 1.0000  











        
tx 1.0000       
citcombined 0.0091 1.0000      
citprofrate 0.0091 0.9999 1.0000     
withholdtax -0.0015 -0.4765 -0.4764 1.0000    
pitdivrate -0.0075 0.0777 0.0776 -0.6074 1.0000   
netpersonaax -0.0073 0.0170 0.0169 -0.3724 0.8791 1.0000  
taxtotal 0.0006 0.6583 0.6582 -0.5850 0.7066 0.7597 1.0000 
 
 toas shfd cash capi ltdb loan cred wkca 
         
toas 1.0000        
shfd 0.8315 1.0000       
cash 0.4803 0.4725 1.0000      
capi 0.5655 0.7074 0.2871 1.0000     
ltdb 0.5277 0.2256 0.1424 0.1405 1.0000    
loan 0.4204 0.2202 0.1121 0.1484 0.1800 1.0000   
cred 0.5159 0.2923 0.2524 0.1668 0.1542 0.3181 1.0000  
wkca 0.5216 0.3549 0.1829 0.1913 0.2035 0.4117 0.3434 1.000 
 
 curr solr prma rcem liqr shlq gear rtas 
         
curr 1.0000        
solr 0.2068 1.0000       
prma 0.1193 0.2877 1.0000      
rcem -0.0657 -0.2116 0.0801 1.0000     
liqr 0.8440 0.1961 0.1154 -0.0474 1.0000    
shlq 0.0486 0.1561 0.0508 0.0048 0.0491 1.0000   
gear 0.0144 -0.3639 -0.0356 0.0261 0.0015 -0.0429 1.0000  
rtas 0.0466 0.2906 0.3543 0.4597 0.0489 0.0474 -0.1732 1.0000 
rshf -0.0243 -0.2835 0.1035 0.6040 -0.0160 -0.0253 0.2479 0.3771 
(to be continued)  
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Table 3.4. Correlations (selected variables) (continued) 
 
 plbt cf gros oope oppl fipl plat pl 
         
plbt 1.0000        
cf 0.9308 1.0000       
gros 0.4851 0.6304 1.0000      
oope 0.2920 0.4646 0.9765 1.0000     
oppl 0.9723 0.9259 0.5200 0.3237 1.0000    
fipl 0.2214 0.1189 -0.0944 -0.1014 -0.0126 1.0000   
plat 0.9966 0.9302 0.4663 0.2726 0.9662 0.2322 1.0000  
pl 0.9901 0.9330 0.4506 0.2579 0.9556 0.2490 0.9906 1.0000 
av 0.6156 0.7715 0.9114 0.8477 0.6416 -0.0436 0.6040 0.5943 
ebit 0.9723 0.9259 0.5200 0.3237 1.0000 -0.0126 0.9662 0.9556 
ebta 0.9061 0.9749 0.6632 0.4956 0.9474 -0.0765 0.9005 0.8882 
 
av ebit ebta  
    
av 1.0000   
ebit 0.6416 1.0000  
ebta 0.7853 0.9474 1.0000 
 
 sales cost gros oope taxa expt mate staf 
         
sales 1.0000        
cost 0.9153 1.0000       
gros 0.8337 0.5414 1.0000      
oope 0.8017 0.4955 0.9964 1.0000     
taxa 0.6913 0.4801 0.7670 0.7366 1.0000    
expt 0.5911 0.4287 0.6217 0.6000 0.8520 1.0000   
mate 0.8446 0.9710 0.4252 0.3756 0.4892 0.4923 1.0000  
staf 0.8632 0.5989 0.9864 0.9816 0.6932 0.5700 0.4653 1.0000 
depre 0.7627 0.5189 0.8896 0.8691 0.6359 0.4015 0.3596 0.9067 
inte 0.1774 0.1341 0.1905 0.1494 0.1254 0.0618 0.0433 0.2431 
opre 0.9995 0.9067 0.8455 0.8145 0.6897 0.5842 0.8300 0.8752 
 
 depre inte opre 
    
depre 1.0000   
inte 0.5643 1.0000  
opre 0.7758 0.1807 1.0000 
 
 gear shfd loan ltdb 
     
gear 1.0000    
shfd -0.0646 1.0000   
loan 0.0533 0.2144 1.0000  
ltdb 0.0943 0.2209 0.1775 1.0000 
Tax effects on MNEs, Appendix  35 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 4.1. Results summary: capital structure – country aggregates 
Model (4.1.1) OLS (4.1.2) RE (4.1.3) RE (4.1.4) RE (4.1.5) RE 
Dep. Var. avgcygear avgcygear avgcygear avgcygear avgcygear 
      
citprofrate 1.911772* 3.2658389*** 3.477293***   
pitdivrate -3.245538*** -1.884825***    
taxtotal 3.029689***     
dtaxtotal    18.56241*  
avgcytx  0.032545   0.193347** 
      
avgcyempl 0.0049936*** 0.0054992***    
avgcysolr -4.24337*** -4.44448***    
avgcyshlq .3784667*** 0.413205***    
l.avgcycurr    9.825753***  
l.avgcysolr    -6.44137*** -14.1035*** 
l.avgcyrshf    -0.3557913  
avgcyyearinc 1.061597* 0.698375    
avgcyInd -186.909** -291.757***  -296.049***  
avgcyMfg    -195.6676*  
avgcyWhl -752.172*** -824.812***  -506.813*** -581.854*** 
l.avgcyAct    200.8405*** 510.774*** 
      
Observations 264 264 288 267 327 
Countries  23 23 22 23 
R-sq. within  02782 0.1201 0.1673 0.4745 
R-sq. between  0.7145 0.7046 0.3459 0.6319 
R-sq. overall 0.5714 0.5645 0.3712 0.2345 0.4816 
Prob>chi2(>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
(i) Model (1) pooled OLS regression; models (2), (3), (4) random effects.   
(ii) All models include a constant. Models (1), (2), (3), (5) include year and country dummies. Country 
dummies: model (1): Czech Rep., Denmark, Italy, UK; model (2): Czech Rep., Denmark, Italy, UK; 
model (3): France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK; model (5): France, Germany, UK. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level.  
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Table 4.2. Results summary: capital structure – pooled regressions 
Model (4.2.1) (4.2.2) (4.2.3) (4.2.4) 
Dep. Variable gear gear gear gear 
     
citprofrate 0.0227518 3.22072***   
pitdivrate -0.5570792***    
taxtotal   1.036059***  
dtaxtotal    4.35267*** 
tx 1.205706***    
l.tx -0.0000833    
     
l.gear 0.5740762*** 0.5800144*** 0.579995*** 0.5804184*** 
Active -11.96491 -13.93825*** -13.9144*** -13.87155*** 
Independence 0.3339305 -0.5054216 -0.6007384 -0.5905318 
Manufacturing -12.09233*** -14.48251*** -14.46244*** -14.48657*** 
Services 6.406681*** 5.127179*** 5.118435*** 5.187553*** 
Retail -7.633938*** -7.321639*** -7.295511*** -7.393582*** 
IFO_eur 0.1426113***    
shfd -1.68e-07*** -1.96e-07*** -1.99e-07*** -1.98e-07*** 
l.toas 1.30e-07*** 1.31e-07*** 1.32e-07*** 1.32e-07*** 
l.plbt 2.96e-07*** 2.50e-07** 2.44e-07*** 2.61e-07** 
l.cf 1.76e-06*** 1.25e-06*** 1.22e-06*** 1.22e-06*** 
l.staf 1.33e-06*** 8.76e-07*** 8.49e-07*** 8.65e-07*** 
l.inte 2.83e-06*** 2.03e-06*** 2.01e-06*** 2.03e-06*** 
l.av -1.68e-06*** -1.22e-06*** -1.19e-06*** -1.19e-06*** 
l.solr -1.736443*** -1.978879*** -1.977791*** -1.978493*** 
l.prma 1.138621*** .9262104*** .9269559*** .9288776*** 
l.rcem 0.2619761*** 0.282237*** 0.2843217*** 0.2851249*** 
l.liqr 1.748896*** 1.838786*** 1.858543*** 1.841204*** 
l.rtas -1.948233*** -2.041914*** -2.047174*** -2.051826*** 
     
Observations 564527 638720 638720 638431 
R-sq. adjusted 0.4990 0.4856 0.4855 0.4859 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
(i) All models pooled OLS regressions. 
(ii) All models include a constant and a lagged dependent variable. All models include country 
dummies; model (1): France, Italy, Spain, UK only. Models (2), (3), (4) include year dummies. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
(iv) Model (1) includes only observations with 0%<=tx<=100%. 
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Table 4.3. Results summary: capital structure – RE/FE models 
Model (4.3.1) RE (4.3.2) RE (4.3.3) FE (4.3.4) FE 
Dep. Variable gear gear gear gear 
     
citprofrate 1.758338*** 1.135137*** 3.40245*** 2.118449*** 
cittargeted_yes -16.91017***  -8.607678***  
pitdivrate -0.8793334*** -0.8922425*** -0.9955553***  
taxtotal  0.2365352   
dtaxtotal  3.567321***   
     
l.gear 0.3716977*** 0.3720863*** 0.2174374*** 0.2175849*** 
Active -18.19*** -18.31878***   
Independence -2.031121 -2.465019   
Manufacturing -32.71781*** -32.43725***   
Services 9.839303*** 10.26639***   
Retail -15.79454*** -15.76581***   
IFO_eur .1405641*** 0.1154583*** 0.1250049*** 0.167089*** 
shfd -2.15e-07*** -2.19e-07*** -1.99e-07*** -2.04e-07*** 
l.toas 1.14e-07*** 1.13e-07*** 1.19e-08 1.54e-08 
l.plbt 3.07e-07*** 3.08e-07*** 4.10e-07*** 4.10e-07*** 
l.cf 8.82e-07*** 8.93e-07*** 3.60e-07 3.25e-07 
l.staf 5.88e-07** 5.92e-07** 4.56e-07* 4.18e-07 
l.inte 6.40e-07* 6.76e-07* -2.41e-06*** -2.37e-06*** 
l.av -8.73e-07*** -8.85e-07*** -3.92e-07 -3.62e-07 
l.solr -2.648594*** -2.642687*** -1.790412*** -1.776722*** 
l.prma 0.6028434*** 0.6006985*** -0.1600377** -0.1455676** 
l.rcem 0.1760459*** 0.1779614*** 0.1072318*** 0.1082056**** 
l.liqr 1.01187*** 1.021685*** 0.0363434 0.0656883 
l.rtas -1.553783*** -1.555309*** -0.8686328*** -0.8862274*** 
     
Observations 638720 636979 638720 638720 
Groups (Firms) 131507 130758 131507 131507 
R-sq. within 0.0733 0.0730 0.0742 0.0738 
R-sq. between 0.5893 0.5906 0.5760 0.5782 
R-sq. overall 0.4698 0.4700 0.4599 0.4604 
Prob > chi2 (>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
(i) Models (1) and (2) estimated with random effects; Models (3) and (4) estimated with fixed effects.  
(ii) All models include a constant. Models (1) and (2) include country dummies: France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, UK. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.4. Results summary: capital structure – IV models 
Model (4.4.1) RE-IV (4.4.2) RE-IV (4.4.3) RE-IV (4.4.4) FE-IV (4.4.5) FE-IV 
Dep. Variable gear gear gear gear gear 
citprofitrate     1.40952*** 
dtaxtotal   2.666312***   
tx 1.63116*** 3.39463*** 2.31361*** 3.86120*** 2.72337*** 
      
l.gear 0.46467*** 0.44821*** 0.45067*** 0.22368*** 0.22436*** 
Active -19.3556*** -17.3587***    
Independence 1.46688 -0.27280    
Manufacturing  -21.7983***    
Services 6.81517*** 9.10959***    
Retail  -17.9104***    
IFO_eur  9.05325 8.03024 19.8291 16.5336* 
shfd -1.82e-07*** -1.59e-07*** -1.71e-07*** -1.65e-07*** -1.82e-07*** 
l.toas 1.23e-07*** 1.41e-07*** 1.54e-07*** 8.94e-09 1.10e-08 
l.empl 0.00021     
l.plbt 3.35e-07*** 3.80e-07*** 4.10e-07*** 3.19e-07** 3.00e-07** 
l.cf 1.13e-06*** 2.14e-06*** 2.02e-06*** 3.84e-07 3.82e-07 
l.staf 7.85e-07*** 1.64e-06*** 1.67e-06*** 3.67e-07 3.49e-07 
l.inte 2.72e-06*** 2.96e-06*** 2.84e-06*** -2.39e-06*** -2.51e-06*** 
l.av -1.17e-06*** -2.09e-06*** -2.04e-06*** -3.93e-07 -3.63e-07 
l.solr -2.10719*** -2.14561*** -2.212395*** -1.68279*** -1.67875*** 
l.prma 1.12849*** 1.18512*** 1.28507*** -0.09384 -0.14246** 
l.rcem 0.24198*** 0.25728*** 0.28510*** 0.16893*** 0.18267*** 
l.liqr 1.38137*** 1.71704*** 1.68967*** 0.31416** 0.28402* 
l.rtas -1.7698*** -1.82739*** -2.05096*** -0.66566*** -0.74825*** 
      
Observations 484266 588996 576171 588996 576171 
Groups (Firms) 112208 127318 124821 127318 124821 
R-sq. within 0.1091 0.0811 0.0829 0.0625 0.0765 
R-sq. between 0.5819 0.5724 0.5749 0.4651 0.5027 
R-sq. overall 0.5136 0.4753 0.4824 0.3786 0.4180 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
(i) Models (1), (2), (3) estimated with random effects; Models (4) and (5) estimated with fixed effects. 
All models IV regressions with tx instrumented; instruments model (1): citprofrate, pitdivrate, l.tx, and 
other variables; model (3): citprofrate, cittargeted_yes, pitdivrate, taxtotal, l.tx, and others; models (2), 
(4): citprofrate, cittargeted_yes, pitdivrate, taxtotal, dtaxtotal, l.tx, and others; model (5): 
cittargeted_yes, pitdivrate, taxtotal, dtaxtotal, l.tx, and others.  
(ii) All models include a constant. All models include year dummies. Models (1) and (2) include 
country dummies; model (1) France, Italy only. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
(iv) Model (1) includes only observations with 0%<=tx<=100%.  
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Table 4.5. Results summary: profits/returns 
Model (4.5.1) OLS (4.5.2) RE (4.5.3) RE (4.5.4) FE (4.5.5) RE-IV 
Dep. Variable rshf rshf rshf rshf rshf 
      
citprofrate 0.045456  0.2098***   
cittargeted_yes 0.988483* 1.292041*** 0.351498 1.165692**  
pitdivrate 0.005943  -0.011432   
taxtotal 0.160286***  0.198096***   
dtaxtotal 0.703894***  0.441963***   
tx     -0.00662*** 
      
l.rshf 0.484855*** 0.3159919*** 0.3036*** 0.144871*** 0.382353*** 
Active 1.493663*** 1.817187*** 2.314681***  1.908772*** 
Independence -1.64548*** -2.632198*** -2.55442***  -2.18295*** 
Manufacturing -1.79932*** -2.551298*** -3.31016***  -2.6198*** 
Services 2.432787*** 3.692003*** 3.988952***  3.249455*** 
Retail 3.289632*** 6.004965*** 5.574298***  4.538336*** 
IFO_eur -1.023723 0.1997943 -0.59587 -0.109261 -0.25212 
shfd -5.64e-09*** -1.07e-08*** -1.23e-08*** -1.41e-08*** -9.84e-09*** 
l.toas 1.30e-09 -1.35e-10 -1.68e-09 3.76e-09*** -1.10e-09 
l.plbt -9.65e-08*** -1.09e-07*** -9.03e-08*** -1.03e-07*** -9.13e-08*** 
l.cf -3.05e-07*** -1.58e-07*** -1.90e-07*** -8.85e-08*** -2.48e-07*** 
l.staf -2.52e-07*** -1.23e-07*** -1.50e-07*** -6.60e-08** -2.01e-07 
l.inte -7.51e-07*** -6.17e-07*** -6.51e-07*** -4.18e-07*** -7.26e-07*** 
l.av 2.94e-07*** 1.69e-07*** 1.95e-07*** 1.04e-07*** 2.47e-07*** 
l.solr -.244179*** -0.345589*** -0.323*** -0.35913*** -0.28822*** 
l.prma -.0120583** -0.045383*** -0.03342*** -0.0234*** -0.02660*** 
l.rcem 0.071976*** 0.05005*** 0.072434*** 0.048244*** 0.076781*** 
l.liqr 0.185074*** 0.103237*** 0.159607*** 0.08477*** 0.167568*** 
l.gear 0.00305*** 0.004026*** 0.004283*** 0.004732*** 0.003868*** 
l.rtas 0.425476*** 0.249689*** 0.243807*** 0.032144*** 0.331901*** 
      
Observations 645751 693017 645751 693017 645302 
Groups (Firms)  149463 131819 149463 131646 
R-sq. within  0.0667 0.0720 0.0745 0.0657 
R-sq. between  0.5861 0.5909 0.4553 0.6060 
R-sq. overall 0.4707 0.4577 0.4513 0.3541 0.4571 
Prob > chi2(>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
(i) Model (1) pooled OLS regression; models (2) and (3) random effects; model (4) fixed effects; 
model (5) random effects IV regression with tx instrumented by citprofrate cittargeted_yes pitdivrate 
taxtotal dtaxtotal l.tx, and other variables.  
 (ii) All models include a constant. All models include year dummies. Models (1), (2), (3), (5) include 
country dummies. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.6. Results summary: profits/levels and margins 
Model (4.6.1) OLS (4.6.2) OLS (4.6.3) RE (4.6.4) FE (4.6.5) RE-IV 
Dep. Variable prma prma plat plat plat 
      
citprofrate -0.04478***  -36853.1*** -19586.2***  
cittargeted_yes 0.594507*** 0.1747753***    
pitdivrate      
taxtotal      
dtaxtotal      
tx  -0.000153***   -176.1577* 
      
l.prma 0.687861*** 0.6424255***    
l.plat   0.2637994*** 0.092186*** 0.0921984*** 
Active 0.258702*** 0.18664*** 123636.5***   
Independence -0.34892*** -0.193743*** -53439.54   
Manufacturing -0.49412*** -0.495438*** -84206.72**   
Services 0.598952*** 0.7879745*** 403796.5***   
Retail -0.870814** -0.555215*** -558399***   
IFO_eur 0.010430*** 0.0148753*** 9711.148***   
sales   0.0405267*** 0.050126*** 0.050145** 
opre  -3.71e-09***    
l.shfd  -6.20e-09***    
l.toas  8.73e-09***    
l.plbt  -5.43e-09***    
l.cf  -5.35e-08***    
l.staf  -6.45e-08***    
l.inte  -4.24e-08***    
l.av  5.53e-08***    
l.solr  0.0421008***    
l.recm  -0.0007074**    
l.liqr  0.0385004***    
l.gear  0.0004442***    
l.rtas  0.0412063***    
      
Observations 860678 690950 798958 799176 799176 
Groups (Firms)   154311 154318 154318 
R-sq. within   0.1640 0.1895 0.1895 
R-sq. between   0.4387 0.2859 0.2855 
R-sq. overall 0.4855 0.4980 0.3883 0.2978 0.2975 
Prob > chi2(>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes.  
(i) Model (1) pooled OLS regression; models (2) and (3) random effects; model (4) fixed effects; 
model (5) fixed effects IV regression with tx instrumented by citprofrate, l.tx, and other variables.  
 (ii) All models include a constant. All models include year dummies. Model (3) includes country 
dummies: France, Germany, Italy, UK. 
(iii) *** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 
 
